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Introduction 
After decades of development policies of the West, little progress has been made in the economic 
situation of the African states (Sachs, 1999, p. 73). Even more, due to the economic crisis, the 
European Union (EU) decreased its financial aid flow to Africa (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2012). Interestingly, some Southern countries have profiled 
themselves as important aid actors in the African region. According to some scholars, mainly the 
involvement of the People’s Republic of China (China) in the region, may become one of the 
most positive development in Africa in years (Tull, 2006, p. 459). However, the EU seems to 
think otherwise. Over the past decades, China’s involvement in Africa has received huge 
attention from the European media and political circles (Tull, 2008, p. 2). China is often 
represented as a self-interested donor, which supports authoritarian regimes, while ignoring 
Western aspects of development such as democracy and human rights promotion (Anshan, 2007, 
p. 83; and for example, Gomes, on behalf of the European Parliament, 2008; European 
Parliament, 2008a, European Parliament, 2008b; European Parliament, 2011; Morazán et al., on 
behalf of the European Union, 2012). Its aid policies are viewed as a way of securing access to 
Africa’s natural resources (Condon, 2012, p. 6; and for example, European Parliament, 2007; 
Gomes, on behalf of the European Parliament, 2008; European Parliament, 2008a; European 
Parliament, 2011) and allows it to conduct ‘land-grabbing’ practices (Hall, 2011, p. 194; and for 
example, Morazán et al., on behalf of the European Union, 2012, p. 20).  
However, many academics argue that the EU’s development policy is not that sincere, 
either. For instance, Abrahamsen (2006) states that western countries hold power on the African 
countries through aid dependencies (p. 1464). Kohnert (2008) argues that the relations between 
the EU and Africa are based on ‘asymmetrical power relations inherited from colonial rule’ (p. 7). 
The EU’s trade policy is centered around self-interest and therefore cause a perpetuation of 
poverty in many African countries. Due to this, trade policies are not compatible with its 
development goals. The increased involvement of China, on the other hand, increased the 
competition in the African region, which turned out well for the African economies (p. 3). 
Therefore, this thesis will question if there are other reasons behind the normative rhetoric of the  
EU to spread negative narratives about China’s development policy in Africa. 
This question is relevant for several reasons. A first reason is that the strong reactions by 
the EU changed the relationships between the EU and Africa and the EU and China 
(Wissenbach, 2009, p. 662). Since China is an important partner of the EU, the EU should not 
risk this relationship on a quarrel which is mainly based on believes within the EU than on reality. 
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Secondly, it will gain more insight in whether or not the accusations of the EU are grounded or 
not. If the EU has a negative perception of China’s policies out of concern for Africa’s 
development, they should be taken more seriously, than when the EU does it out of self-interest. 
Third, actors1 outside the EU, might be influenced by the perception of the EU towards China. 
This would have a negative effect on the image of China.  
In answering the research question, this thesis is structured as follows. The first section 
will consist of a methodology section in which the theory and practice of discourse analysis will 
be discussed. The second section will be an analysis about the perceptions towards China in 
Africa within the different organs of the EU, through time. In this analysis, several documents - 
mainly of the EU, European Council, European Parliament (EP), European Commission (EC) – 
will be used. These documents are different policy papers, reports, resolutions, reports of 
discussion, etcetera, ranging from 2005 until 2013. This thesis will solely discuss the European 
angle on this subject, thus, no Chinese literature will be used. Some secondary literature will be 
used in order to understand the political context in which these documents are produced and 
what political effects these text had. The third section will look at if the EU itself is any different 
from China and if it is such a benevolent donor as it claims. In doing so, there will be looked at 
what the interests of the EU are in giving financial aid to Africa. There will be discussed whether 
the concept of ‘normative power Europe’ is based on reality or rhetoric. The fourth section will 
look at the possibility if states could use a negative narrative of other states, in order to reach 
certain gains for themselves. The last section will be the conclusion of this thesis.  
  
                                                 
1 In this thesis, the definition of ‘actor’ by Frieden et al. (2010) will be used: ‘[t]he basic unit for the analysis of 
international politics; can be individuals or groups of people with common interests’ (p. A-1). 
 
 
6 
 
Methods 
 
 
Discourse Analysis 
There are many ways in which ‘discourse’ can be defined. Foucault (2002) defines discourses as 
‘practices that systematically form the object of which they speak’ (p. 54). By this he means that 
our language about a certain object, changes our knowledge about this object.  
This thesis will be written from a post-structural perspective. Theory on this subject 
assumes that there are no such things as ‘universal truths or absolute ethical positions’ (Graham, 
2011, p. 666). A discourse must be viewed ‘as a matter of the social, historical and political 
conditions under which statements come to count as true or false’ (Hook, 2008, p. 542). Thus, 
discourses are constructed by the social system, but they also ensure that the social system is 
reproduced. This is done by processes of domination, exclusion and selection (ibid., p. 522). 
Therefore, power is important in the shaping-process of what we regard as ‘the truth’ or 
knowledge. Hence, ‘truth’ can be reduced to a reflection of the most dominant constructions of 
knowledge. That power shapes common knowledge will be a basic assumption in this thesis.  
 Historical representations are central within discourse analysis. A historical representation 
is how the object under investigation ‘has been represented over time and space’ (Dunn, 2008, p. 
79). The representations of this object become ‘knowledge’ or ‘regimes of truth’ as it is 
discursively produced, consumed and circulated by society (ibid.). Thus, a historical 
representation is the product of a discourse. Hence, in this thesis there will be looked at the 
historical representation of China by the EU. However, it will appear throughout this thesis, that 
it is not only important what the representation of China by the EU is, but also what the self-
representation of the EU is.  
 
Pros and Cons of Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis is a useful method in understanding how and why actors, objects or events are 
represented by actors. Although discourse analyses might provide some insight into a certain 
subject, it cannot give complete answers to a certain question. As Fairclough (2003) put it: ‘we 
The primary method in this thesis will be a discourse analysis. However, there are many 
forms of discourse analyses and different ideas about how a discourse analysis should be 
used. This section will discuss what kind of discourse analysis will be used in this thesis. 
It will discuss some pros and cons of this particular kind of discourse analysis and how it 
is applied in this thesis.  
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should assume that no analysis of a text can tell us all there is to be said about it – there is no 
such thing as a complete and definitive analysis of a text’ (p. 14). There are many facets within a 
text to which one can pay attention to. Thus, although this thesis might give a basic overview, it 
is far from a complete understanding about the interactions between the EU, China and Africa.  
Additionally, it could be argued that the practice of discourse analysis is quite subjective. 
It is always open to interpretation and there can be a selection bias in the process. Therefore, one 
must bear in mind that the analysis of a researcher might always be influenced by its own social 
background.  
Discourse analysis could enhance our understanding how common knowledge is a 
product of ‘truth’ constructions by power relations. However, as Milliken (1999) states, the field 
of ‘International Relations theory is one of the many sites of the production of common sense’ 
(p. 238). Thus, while it is a goal of discourse analysis to change the common sense of society, it 
simultaneously reinforces another common sense.  
 
Conducting a Discourse analysis 
When conducting a discourse analysis, it is first necessary to select texts. As Neumann (2008) 
states, when reading secondary literature, it becomes apparent which texts are anchor points for 
the research topic (p. 67). Thus, secondary literature was first read as point of departure. Other 
texts were selected by searching on terms as ‘China’, ‘Africa’, ‘development policy’, etcetera, on 
various websites of different organs of the EU. There is always the possibility that not every text 
is included. However, as Neumann argues, this is not necessarily a problem, because ‘relatively 
few texts will constitute the main points of reference’ (p. 70).   
A second step Neumann gives, is the mapping of representations. In this step, one has to 
identify the ‘various representations and possible asymmetries between them’ (ibid.). This is done 
by looking at how different organs within the EU represented the presence of China in Africa. In 
this step, it is not only important what is explicitly said in a text, but also what is implicitly 
mentioned and what is not said at all. There will be looked at how a certain use of words 
generates a representation of China and the EU itself.  
 Neumann’s third step is the layering of discourses. In this step, there will be 
demonstrated that representations ‘differ in historical depth, in variation, and in degree of 
dominance/marginalization in the discourse’ (p. 73). Herein, there must be questioned what 
‘degree of social construction’ there exists between the relation of ‘representation’ and ‘fact’ (p. 
74). The differences of what the EU says and what actually happens will be under investigation.  
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Different Opinions within the EU 
 
Opinions within the EU through Time 
As Castillejo (2013) explains in a policy brief, the response of the EU towards China’s increased 
role as a donor has not been coherent. It went from harsh criticism to ideas of broad 
collaboration between the donors and recipients (p. 2). Additionally, Huliaras argues that many 
journalists, academics and politicians tend to analyze the EU and China as a unitary actors, 
following clear-cut strategies towards Africa. This led to misinterpretations about how the 
interactions between China, Africa and the EU are (p. 425). Therefore, this paragraph will 
provide a more detailed overview of what the different perceptions of the different organs within 
the EU through time were.  
Around the mid 2000’s, China’s interference in Africa became a topic on the EU agenda. 
In the EU strategy for Africa report of 2005, China’s interference in Africa was mentioned a few 
times. In the paragraph Geopolitical dynamics: areas of insecurity and centres of stability, China was 
described as an emerging economy, which has become a provider of new export markets and 
important source of foreign investment. According to this report, China’s engagement in Africa 
has to do with the strategic and political importance of the continent, together with its economic 
potential. It said that the interference of China - and other new external players such as Brazil or 
India - changed the geopolitical context, which ‘poses new challenges and opportunities for the 
formulation and implementation of the EU’s Africa policy’ (European Commission, 2005, p. 10).  
According to Castillejo (2013), it was in 2006 that the EU and China together discussed 
the development of the African countries on China-EU summits for the first time, but without 
concrete outcomes (p. 3). In a report about EU-China relations, Africa is only mentioned in the 
context of energy security. The EC states that the EU and China share a responsibility and 
common interest in ensuring the sustainability and security of energy supplies. Both parties are 
called to work together to increase international cooperation, in order ‘to improve transparency 
and reliability of energy data and the exchange of information aimed at improving energy security 
Before analyzing why the EU seems to be negative towards China in Africa, it is 
necessary to understand what this negative attitude might be and by whom it is 
constructed. This section will question what the different views among the different 
actors of the EU are through time. In answering this question, it will become clear which 
actors within the EU contributed to the negative historical representation of China in 
Africa.  
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in developing countries, including Africa’ (European Commission, 2006, p. 5). In the case of 
development policies, this report calls the EU and China to engage in a dialogue, and to be 
transparent about the activities and priorities of both China and the EU. In addition, it is 
recommended that they both support regional initiatives to improve African governance. It is 
further recommended to look for opportunities to integrate China in the international 
improvement of aid coordination and efficiency (ibid., p. 6). Notably, although the EC tells 
something about difficulties with divergent values with China (p. 4), these differences are not 
mentioned in relation with China’s Africa policy.  
However, these steps towards cooperation between China, the EU and Africa was not 
backed by the EP. In August 2007, the EP published a study – written by Holslag (2007) - which 
was critical about China’s impact in Africa. In this report, Chinese Resources and Energy Policy in Sub-
Saharan Africa,  the EP argued that the energy and resources policy of China, undermined the 
‘conditional engagement approach[2] and the actorness[3] of the EU as an international player’ (p. 
i). The EP argued that China involved in Africa in order to guarantee foreign supplies in the long-
run, by combining free-trade policy with a ‘realistic control-over-the-well approach’ (p. 24). That 
the EP perceives China as a realist actor – which only acts out of self-interest -  is confirmed by 
its use of words. For instance, it talks about ‘China’s Africa offensive’ in describing China’s quest 
for resources (p. 31). In addition, the perception of the EP of China as a self-interested actor also 
becomes clear when it argues that China is conducting its go-out strategy for resources on 
corrupt, repressive and weak regimes, because the Chinese companies face less competition from 
these states (p. 47).  
At the 10th China-Africa Summit on 28 November 2007, both China and the EU had the 
intensions to continue their dialogue on Africa’s development. According to the European 
Council (2007a), they both welcomed ‘a more practical cooperation by the two sides through 
their respective existing cooperation mechanism with Africa’. With existing cooperation 
mechanisms they mean the EU-Africa Summit and the Forum on China-Africa cooperation (p. 
5). 
In the same year, on December 9, the European Council published The Africa-EU Strategic 
Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy. In this report, it is stated that the partnership between the 
EU and Africa ‘will be based on a Euro-African consensus on values, common interest and 
                                                 
2 This entails that the aid the EU provides, is tied to some conditions, for example the condition that the recipient 
country should implement certain democratic principles. 
3 Actorness can be defined as ‘the ability to function actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the 
international system (Smith, 2008, p. 25 cited in Greiçevci, 2011, p. 285). 
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common strategic objectives’ (2007b, p. 2). Some of these values mentioned are ‘human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law’ (ibid.). With this report, European Council seems to 
promote the idea that it is a benevolent donor. In addition, another objective was to ‘promote 
more accurate images of each other, in place of those that are dominated by inherited negative 
stereotypes and that ignore the overwhelmingly positive developments on the two continents’ (p. 
4). This also implies that the EU wants to maintain its positive image. The report also stated that 
the EU needed to shift from traditional relationships to a ‘real partnership’ which is characterized 
by ‘equality and the pursuit of common objectives’ (p. 4). Thus, this means that is gradually shifts 
from ‘aid’ to ‘trade’ policies in Africa. It does not seem to be the case that the Council has a 
negative stance towards the ‘emerging’ donors. Rather, it states that both the EU and Africa 
recognize ‘the need to broaden their cooperation with third partners through enhanced tripartite 
dialogue’ (p. 14). It is said that this is needed ‘to ensure coherence and complementarity with the 
work of other international actors’ (ibid.).  
On 28 March 2008, Member of Parliament (MEP), Ana Maria Gomes – member of the 
Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PSE Group) - drafted a report named China’s policy 
and its effects on Africa (Gomes, 2008). In order to cope with the increased involvement of China in 
Africa, this report proposed that a dialogue with China on Africa would be useful. However, it 
was stressed that such a response to the ‘new challenges raised by emerging donors in Africa (…) 
must not attempt to emulate China’s methods and aims, since that would not necessarily be 
compatible with the EU’s values, principles and long-term interests’ (ibid., p. 11). Notably, it was 
stressed in the report that the EU should have an constructive and open attitude towards China, 
without imposing European views and models (p. 12). However, later on it is suggested that the 
EU should encourage China to adopt similar principles regards to control of illegal trades of 
timber and ivory (p. 14). In addition, it urges China to act responsible towards its ecological 
impact in Africa (p. 16) and it urges China to respect the principles of human rights, democracy 
and good governance in their relationship with Africa (p. 18). It is stated that China’s policy of 
no-strings attached, hinders improvements in good governance, human rights and democratic 
progress. Thus, although the report proposes a dialogue with China, the negative perception 
towards China’s engagement in Africa, shimmers trough the text. In this report, it is assumed that 
China’s main driver to engage in Africa is its quest for oil and other natural resources, and new 
markets. Africa is attractive for China, because the African countries do not have the capacity to 
control their own natural resources, since there are barely regulatory constraints. Beside the 
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economic strategic interest, it is believed that China also ‘seeks to reinforce political leverage, 
gather endorsement for the “one China policy” and profile itself as a global power’ (ibid., p. 21).  
This report led to a discussion on April 22, 2008, which is written down in the report 
Debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In this debate, the differences in 
opinion between the EP and EC are clear. The views shared by the MEP towards China in Africa 
are quite negative. Most of them view China as a (neo)colonial power, which exploits Africa’s 
natural resources and does not pay attention to democracy, human rights and good governance, 
in its no-strings attached non-transparent development policy. However, Member of the 
Commission Louis Michel, took a more understanding attitude towards China’s policy in Africa. 
For instance, he acknowledged that China has strategic, economic and diplomatic interests in 
Africa, but he also pointed out that ‘Europe has all too often made the mistake of not admitting 
that it is tempted by the same thing’ (2008a, p. 176). He also agrees that China lacks attention to 
democracy, rule of law and governance. What makes his opinion different in this, is that the MEP 
see these points as a condition for a dialogue with China, whereas Mr. Michel proposes that these 
points can be stipulated within a dialogue with China (p. 174). First a dialogue, then a discussion 
about certain norms, instead of the other way around.  
Eventually, the report by Ana Maria Gomes changed into a resolution which was agreed 
upon on 23 April 2008, by the EP. According to Carbone (2011), this resolution was a setback in 
the process of constructive engagement with China. The European Parliament saw China as a 
‘competitor’ (Carbone, 2011, p. 212). For instance, in this resolution it was mentioned that the 
EU is in ‘competition with other donor nations’ (2008b, p. 8). In order to position itself vis-à-vis 
its ‘competitors’ it was recommended to offer aid which is ‘qualitatively more attractive’ (ibid). It 
also accused China of using aid-for-oil strategies (ibid., p. 5). In addition, it did not want the EU 
to engage in trilateral cooperation with China and Africa, if they had to compromise about 
human rights and democracy issues (Carbone, 2011, p. 212-213). The adopted resolution referred 
to the principle of solidarity and the aspiration of the EU to be a normative power. For example, 
it is recommended to ‘persuade Chinese authorities to encourage national banks to adopt the 
“Equator Principles” on social and environmental standards’, ‘encourage China to voluntarily 
adopt the provisions of the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention’, ‘encourage China to ratify the 
ILO [International Labour Organization] Conventions’ (p. 14), and so on. These 
recommendations are likely to enhance the EU’s normative image, which will be discussed in the 
following section. This report caused a ‘we-they’ feeling, implicitly identifying China as a major 
threat and the EU as a benevolent donor (ibid., p. 213). 
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The European Commission took a more constructive approach, and published a report 
naming The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation, on October, 17, 2008. 
Notably, this report does not discuss the importance of values and principles of the EU in its 
development policy. The report proposes a more pragmatic way of cooperation between China, 
the EU and Africa (p. 5). The concrete objectives of trilateral cooperation mentioned in this 
report, lie in the areas of peace and security, infrastructure, sustainable management of natural 
resources and the environment and food security and agriculture (p. 5-6). However, this report 
was criticized by the European Economic Social Committee and the European Parliament. Their 
critique mainly sprung form the argument that democracy and human rights should have a 
central role in any trilateral process. In addition, Chinese officials thought that the report of the 
European Commission ‘was an attempt to ‘sociali[z]e’ China’, and African policymakers 
perceived it as ‘an attempt at big power collusion over Africa’. Thus, the proposal was put aside 
(Castillejo, 2013, p. 3).    
In the report Trade and Economic Relations with China of 2009 - written by Wortmann-Kool 
(2009) on behalf of the EP Committee on International Trade - the EP took a more positive 
attitude to the EC’s attempt to engage in trilateral cooperation. In regards to China’s pursuit of 
natural and energy resources, it welcomes the report EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue 
and cooperation (p. 20). However, the EP still mentioned its concern about China’s ‘lack of any 
reference to existing social, environmental and human rights standards for foreign investments’. 
(p. 24). In addition, it wanted a trialogue between the EU, China and Africa, to make the 
activities regarding the exploitation of natural resources by China more transparent (ibid.). Also, 
it called on China to increase its Official Development Assistance in relation to agriculture, 
infrastructure and health sectors. Additionally, more coordination between Chinese and EU aid 
would lead to more efficient use of aid (p. 25). Thus, in this report, the EP does want to 
cooperate with China, but still takes a patronizing attitude. 
In 2010, the House of Lords European Union Committee published the report Stars and 
Dragons: The EU and China. In contrast with the EP, the Committee has a much more clear 
believe that China’s engagement in Africa might endanger EU interests. It states:  
 
China’s worldwide search for resources to feed its economic development has implications for the 
EU’s own economic and industrial needs. The EU must monitor Chinese commodity deals, 
whether on food, minerals or energy resources, to ensure that Europe’s strategic interests and 
access to global resources are safeguarded (p. 67) 
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Still, in 2011, the EP saw China’s export finance activities with African countries as a way to 
secure access to new markets and natural resources. In addition, China’s activities were seen as an 
instrument to enhance its influence in these countries to become a ‘global superpower’ (Massa, 
on behalf of the European Parliament, 2011, p. 17). And because China is not a member of the 
OECD community, it does not have to comply with its rules about social, economic and 
environmental standards. Thus, it was said that Chinese exporters have an unfair advantage 
compared with their competitors from Western countries (ibid.). These arguments were still 
present in the 2012 report EU and China: Unbalanced Trade? (De Sarnez on behalf of the European 
Parliament Committee on Trade, 2012). Although in the 2013 resolution EU-China relations, the 
EP welcomed China’s ‘current open promotion of a diversification of its activities on the African 
continent’, it was still critical about its disregards to human rights and security (European 
Parliament, 2013, p. 14). Hence, although the opinion of the EP seems to have become 
somewhat moderate, it is still critical on the same points about values and principles.  
Thus, the perception of the EU towards the policies of China in Africa is not based on a 
shared consensus between its different institutions. Mainly the EP seemed to have concerns 
about China in Africa. Its criticism is mainly based on the fact that China has a no-strings 
attached policy. In contrast with the EU, it does not pay attention to the promotion of human 
rights, good governance and democracy. The EC is also critical about China’s Africa policy, but 
in a much more moderate way. In the view of the EC, the EU cannot afford to be too critical 
towards China’s policy. Probably because China is an important ally for the EU. Thus, it seems 
useful to focus the rest of the thesis on the European Parliament’s attitude towards China in 
Africa, instead on the EU as a whole.  
 
Views of the Different Parties and MEPs 
Remarkable is that the views between the different MEPs and parties did not differed greatly. For 
instance, only sixteen MEPs voted against the report of Ana Maria Gomes of 2008, against the 
618 MEPs who voted in favor. Seventeen of the MEPs did not vote at all (European Parliament, 
2008c, p. 1). It is, however, nowhere explicitly mentioned which MEPs voted against the 
adaptation of this report.  
 In a debate report of 2008, there are some slight differences in opinion between the 
MEP’s. In this debate, 31 MEP’s – rapporteur Ana Maria Gomes excluded – of six different 
parties participated. Almost all MEPs are concerned about China’s lack of respect to democracy, 
human rights, rule of law and good governance (p. 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 191, 
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192) and its access to raw materials (p. 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 186, 187, 192, 193). However, 
they differ in how to react towards the increased engagement of China. Some suggest that 
cooperation with China in Africa is needed, while others are reluctant to work with this self-
interested donor, which does not comply to the European norms. Remarkably, within parties the 
opinions are not coherently shaped. For instance, Karin Saks of the PSE Group believes that 
cooperation with China is not possible (p. 185). At the same time, her party-member Józef Pinoir 
argues that he ‘would like to see China as a real partner of the European Union in the process of 
globalisation’ (p. 178). Thus, while there were some differences of opinions between the MEPs, 
there were no substantial differences between parties.  
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Normative Power Europe? 
 
Use of Norms and Values 
According to Manners (2002), Europe can be identified as a normative power in international 
relations. Normative power can be viewed as ‘the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in 
world politics’ (p. 236). By pursuing immaterial aspects, such as status and reputation states can 
generate normative power (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2009, p. 83). In its purest form, normative 
power is without other forms of power, such as physical force or material incentives (Manners, 
2009, p. 10). This concept ‘acknowledges the normative foundations of Europe’s supranational 
project and the EU’s apparent predisposition to act in accordance with embedded ethical 
principles concerning human well-being’ (Langan, 2011, p. 244). According to Manners (2002), 
the normative basis of the EU consists of five core norms, namely, peace, liberty, democracy, rule 
of law and ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (p. 242, emphasis in the 
original). Manners also discusses four ‘minor’ norms, which are: social solidarity, anti-
discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (p. 242-243).  
 However, the idea that the EU is a normative or ethical power, rests on the assumption 
that universal values and norms exist. As Hyde-Price (2008) explains, states with power-
maximizing or hegemonic goals tend to use this universalist language to cover their own national 
interests (Hyde-Price, 2008, p. 33). Langan (2012) also argues that the concept of ‘normative 
power Europe’ can rather be seen as the ability of the EU to achieve commercial or geopolitical 
interests. It uses moral narratives to legitimize its actions in the relations with its ‘external 
‘partners” (p. 244-245). He claims that the practices of the EU should be framed in the light of a 
‘moral economy’. He defines this concept as ‘both the study of how moral norms are infused 
within economic structures and possibly work to shape, veil, or legitimise economic practices – as 
well as to the object of study of this analysis, that is to instituted moral economies’ (p. 250). This 
is in contrast with Manners’ notion of normative power, since the concept of moral economy 
From the previous section appeared that mainly the EP constantly uses the narrative of 
norms and values in blocking trilateral cooperation between China, the EU and Africa. It 
was not willing to engage in trilateral cooperation, because China refused to align its 
policy with the norms and values of the EU. However, it is questionable whether the EU 
itself is such a benevolent donor. This section will question the notion of ‘normative 
power Europe’ and will argue that this self-identity is used in order to protect certain 
interests of the EU.  
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assumes that norm-laden ideas of policy are not necessarily moral in their outcomes. Instead, in a 
moral economy, the actor is aware of how moralities can be used to obscure present power 
relations. Moralities can help to maintain the ‘economic systems that have negative outcomes for 
those whom economic activity is nominally supposed to serve’ (p. 251). From a moral economy 
perspective, there is no ‘reductive binary opposition’ between self-interest and ethical or moral 
norms (p. 252).  
According to Langan, this is especially true in the case of EU’s development policy in 
Africa. During the historical course of the Africa-EU ties, the moral economy of these ties has 
been core legitimizing the EU’s norms which relate to its ‘duty to help ‘the poor’’ and to facilitate 
development for them. Other norms are compensation for its colonial past and social and 
economic solidarity towards economic less developed countries (Langan, 2012, p. 254). These 
norms have become the foundation of the ‘instituted moral economy’ of Africa-EU cooperation. 
They are seemingly ‘ethical parameters’ and aims for an effective economic relation between 
these ‘partners’ (Langan, 2012, p. 254). However, the moral economy was not a moral economy 
in the sense that norms were purely institutionalized, from an altruistic motivation. Langan states 
that in EU-Africa relations, ‘moral norms are often used to perpetuate and entrench European 
interests which are pursued at the expense of nominal ethical drivers’ (p. 265). The true nature of 
‘normative power Europe’ is the capability to utilize ethical norms in the self-rationalization and 
public legitimization of the pursuit of geopolitical and economic interests abroad (p. 254). For 
instance, as Youngs (2004) claims, some governments in the EU believe that the EU’s external 
operations gain legitimacy from its citizens when they are carried out to defense European values 
(p. 417). Citizens will believe that the use of force by the EU lacks ‘dubious interest’ which in the 
past drove interventions by states alone (p. 417-418). In addition, the adaptation of normative 
aspects in its external policy will lead to a decrease in pressure from non-governmental 
organizations (p. 418). This might explain why the EP in particular is negative towards China in 
Africa. Since it is a parliament, it is important for the different parties to preach what the people 
want. This increases the chance that a party gets reelected.  
 
Interests in Africa 
If the EU really uses moral narratives to legitimize its actions and secure its interest in Africa, the 
EU must have some interests in Africa which it wants to protect. Thus, this paragraph will 
discuss which interests drove the EU in giving financial aid to Africa.  
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From the beginning, the development policies of the EU were based on self-interest. 
During the period of decolonization, the EU-Africa relations were established because some 
member states wanted to keep their formal ties with former colonies. They wanted to retain 
access to natural resources and raw materials and to protect their investments in these countries 
(Farell, 2005, p. 266). In addition, the economic ties with Africa would also expand the export 
markets of Europe (van Reisen, 2007, p. 31).  
In order to retain its influences on its former colonies, the EU established the Lomé 
Convention in 1975 (Zanger, 2000, p. 300). The most important characteristics of the 
Convention were the non-reciprocity in trade preferences in the export from the ACP countries 
to the European countries; ideas of mutual interest, sovereignty and equality; each state has the 
right to determine its policies; and, ‘security of relations based on the achievements of the 
cooperation system’ (European Commission, 2012a). Strikingly, these points are to a high extent 
congruent with the China’s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance, as formulated 
on January 1964. Comparable principles are: equality and mutual benefit; sovereignty and no-
conditions or privileges attached; independent economic development and self-reliance (Chinese 
Government’s Official Web Portal, 2012).  
Nowadays, the EU’s external development action is mainly based on The European 
Consensus on Development (European Commission, 2012b). In this statement, the primary objective 
of the EU’s development cooperation is stated as the ‘eradication of poverty in the context of 
sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’ 
(ibid.). Development is seen as a primary goal by itself and is regarded as sustainable when it 
includes human rights, good governance and economic, environmental, political and social 
aspects (ibid., p. 5).  
Although norms and values have become central in its rhetoric around development 
policy, it is likely that the EU still gives development aid to safeguard certain interests. As Younas 
(2008) claims, aid could be used to secure trade benefits. It could enhance the goodwill of the 
recipient country, which will make the recipients more inclined to import more products of the 
donor country (p. 662). Using aid to secure trade benefits, might be done by the EU, since it has 
important economic interests in Africa. According to Olivier (2011), about one-third of all the 
exports from the EU go to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the imports 
of the EU make up more than one fifth of the total export of these resource rich countries. 
Primarily Africa is important for the EU, since it relies on the relative inexpensive oil and raw 
materials it exports (p. 54). Moreover, in a report by the European Union Committee (2010), it is 
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said that the EU promotes good governance in order to ensure ‘a level playing field for European 
companies’ (p. 68). Thus, behind the altruistic narrative of implementing certain norms and 
values, there are economic interests for the EU itself.  
Besides the economic interests, there are also political interests for the EU. Namely, the 
EU might gain soft power by giving development aid to African countries. Soft power can be 
defined as ‘the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, 
persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes’ (Nye, 2011, p. 
20-21). It differs from normative power, since it is not founded upon certain norms and values. 
As the EC (2009) itself acknowledges, external development assistance is an important 
component of the international influence of the EU and ‘effective instruments of its soft power’ 
(p. 18).  
 
Interests in Danger 
Some MEPs see the interference of China in Africa as a threat to the economic interests of the 
EU, which might explain why it is negative towards China in Africa. For example, MEP Colm 
Burke, of the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European 
Democrats (PPE-DE) Group, states that corrupt leaders in Africa prefer the lucrative deals of 
China, which do not impose any conditions, leaving the EU out (European Parliament, 2008a, p. 
185-186). Zbigniew Krzysztof Kuźmiuk of the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) Group, 
shares this opinion. He states that the aid that is offered by the EU should be linked to an 
expansion of its trade relation with the African countries (p. 187). Thus, this suggests that aid is 
given by the EU in order to secure favorable trade relations with African countries. The MEP 
fears that the tightened China-Africa relationship could cause a decay in the EU-Africa trade 
relation.  
Zita Pleštinská (PPE-DE Group) also had concerns regarding the effects of China’s aid 
policy on EU-Africa trade. She called China’s ambition to become Africa’s most important 
trading partner ‘a serious challenge for the EU’ (ibid.). This idea is also adopted in the EP’s 
resolution about China in Africa of 2008, wherein the EP states that it ‘[t]akes the view that, 
given China’s engagement in Africa, cooperation with Africa in the field of the EU’s external 
energy policy should be given greater significance’ (p. 10). It seems like the EP holds the view 
that it is competing for favorable trade circumstances with China in Africa. As the resolution also 
mentioned, the EP recognizes that the economic investment of the EU is ‘at a competitive 
disadvantage in Africa due to hidden subsidizing of Chinese projects and offers made by the 
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Chinese government - or wholly state-owned companies -, to higher costs caused by social and 
economic standards which Chinese competitors do not meet, to tied Chinese aid which prevents 
European companies from joining projects financed by Chinese aid and to limited access to 
financing and investment risk coverage instruments for European companies’ (2008a, p. 16). 
Some MEPs do even seem to think that the Chinese ‘steal’ resources which are ‘theirs’. For 
instance, Paul Marie Coûteaux from the Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) Group argued 
that China was ‘gaining control over our staple commodities’. 
Thus, it is more likely that the EP had a negative perception towards China in Africa, 
because it feared for its own interest, than it was concerned about China’s lack human rights, 
good governance and democracy. After all, in reality its own development policy is also mainly 
focused on securing its own interests in Africa.  
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Spreading a Narrative: A Political Tool? 
 
Identity Politics 
As noted earlier, if states enhance their reputation or image, their soft power might increase. 
Thus, it is beneficial for countries to have a high reputation or positive image. Hence, the self-
representation of the EU as a normative actor, might have important benefits. In the same vein, 
representing China as a ‘rogue’ donor, might be a strategy for the EP to decrease China’s soft 
power in the region of Africa. This would make the EU a more attractive donor, and thereby, the 
EU can protect its interests in the region.   
This claim can be supported by Diez (2005). As Diez argues, ‘the narrative of ‘normative 
power Europe’ constructs the EU’s identity as well as the identity of the EU’s others in ways 
which allow EU actors to disregard their own shortcomings unless a degree of self-reflexivity is 
inserted’ (p. 626-627). In other words, by presenting itself as a ‘normative power’ the EU is not 
only constructing an image of itself, but also what others are not. This allows the EU to feel and 
presenting itself ‘better’ than others. Diez (2005) mentions several strategies of constructing the 
‘self’ and the ‘other’ in international politics. One of these could be applicable to the EP, namely 
the representing of the other as violating universal principles. Here, the standards of the self are 
presented as universally valid. This has the ‘consequence that the other should be convinced or 
otherwise brought to accept the principles of the self’ (p. 628). According to Scheipers & Sicurelli 
(2008), this ‘mechanism of ‘othering’ is central in the construction of the EU’s identity as a 
normative power in its external relations’ (p. 610). As noted earlier, the EP held the view that 
China’s aid competes with traditional aid. Thus, in making the Chinese aid less attractive, the EU 
could enhance its own status as an important development aid power, securing certain self-
interested gains, discussed in the previous section. However, this theory of constructing images 
of the self and the other, has never been coupled to perception of the EU regarding China-Africa 
relations.  
As appeared from section two, mainly the EP was against trilateral cooperation with 
China and Africa, mainly by using idealist narratives about human rights and democracy 
issues. However, as argued in section three, the EU’s development policy is probably 
more focused on self-interest than it is on normative aspects. Thus, the stance of the EU 
that China is a ‘rogue’ donor, is not based on its normative basis, but on its normative 
narrative. This section will argue that the EU uses this negative perception of China in 
Africa, in order to enhance its own image. This might protect certain interests which are 
discussed in the previous section.  
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The following will discuss this theory. First, it will look at how the EU portrays itself. It 
constructs a certain self-identity, through which it might gain soft power, and eventually, secure 
its interests in Africa. Second, there will be discussed how the EU simultaneously constructs 
identities of the other, and how it uses its narratives to enforce these identities.  
 
Constructing the Self 
Africa has always played an important role in shaping the ‘normative’ identity of the EU. 
According to Hengari (2012), ‘Africa has been, since the beginning of the European integration, 
an important part of the external identity of Europe’ (p. 2). The Schuman Declaration of 1950 
stated that the development of Africa, is one of Europe’s essential tasks. The adoption of 
concerns about Africa in this declaration, was mainly the result of a colonial history between 
certain European countries and African countries (p. 1).  
 As said in the previous paragraph, in order to promote its identity, it could be that the EU 
promotes its values and ideas as universal applicable. This is certainly the case. For instance, on 
the website of EuropeAid of the EC it is stated that ‘[t]he European Union believes that 
democracy and human rights are universal values that should be vigorously promoted around the 
world. They are integral to effective work on poverty alleviation and conflict prevention and 
resolution (…)’ (European Commission, 2012c).  
Besides promoting its ideas and values as universal applicable, the EP also portrays itself 
as a distinctive normative actor. Take for example the following quote by Zbigniew Krzysztof 
Kuźmiuk of the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) Group: 
 
Over the past 15 years, the value of trade between China and Africa has increased 20 times over. 
It looks as if the European Union is not in a position to counter this expansion. We therefore 
need to encourage China to ensure that its economic involvement in Africa includes a social and 
an environmental aspect, as well as maintenance of democratic standards. The European Union 
should keep tabs on China’s expansion in Africa. We do, after all, continue to be the greatest 
donor to African countries (p. 187) 
 
How the MEP phrases his argumentation, is important for the message the text generates. By 
saying that the EU ‘should keep tabs on China’s expansion in Africa’, it stages itself as a kind of 
watchdog of global affairs. In addition, it presents China as a unitary actor, although its 
development policy involves various actors. 
 The following quote by Konrad Szymánski (UEN Group) also illustrates that the MEP 
regards the EU as a distinctive actor in international relations:  
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Today we have to concede that Europe is powerless in this situation. Of course we can follow up 
the Commissioner’s appeals and bin the OECD’s principles as regards corruption and public 
finances, and then we can do the same with other international understandings. Finally, we can 
even bin the United Nations Charter, but in that case we shall cease to know what our role in 
world politics is based on, and in what way we differ from other players in world politics. (p. 179) 
 
The MEP claims that certain norms and values which the EU uphold, makes the EU a distinctive 
actor in world politics. He does not state, however, why this is important for the EU.  
That the EU uses its external actions in Africa as a way to enhance its reputation, could 
be evidenced with the visibility reports of the EC. In these reports, the EC evaluates how the 
image of the EU is promoted with its external actions. These reports make it clear that the EU 
does want to promote a certain image of itself. Otherwise, it would not take the time to write 
such reports. In addition, some statements in the reports support the argument that the EU 
wants to construct a positive image of itself, such as following statement: ‘The public image of 
the EU’s external action is substantially in line with what the EU itself has sought to promote’ 
(European Commission, 2012, p. 2). It also becomes clear from these reports, that the EU is not 
always keen on cooperating with other institutions or governments: 
 
Partnerships with other organisations (UN, governments, NGOs, etc.) are vital in EU external 
action, but there is a trade-off as visibility then needs to be shared. This remains a source of 
tension and too much insistence being put on EU visibility can undermine the effectiveness of the 
cooperation and the sense of ownership felt by partners’ (ibid.).  
 
Perhaps, working together with China would lead to a too large decrease of its visibility, since 
China has become an important actor for Africa’s development. In order to ensure that China 
would not take away the EU’s status as the most important development actor in Africa, it could 
construct images of the ‘other’.  
 
Constructing the Other 
Constructing a negative narrative around China’s policy in Africa is done in several ways. First, 
the documents of the different institutions of the EU could affect the opinions of other actors. 
As appeared throughout the documents, the MEPs often used a lot of subjective expressions in 
their speeches about China’s actions in Africa. Words such as ‘(neo)colonialism’ (European 
Parliament, 2008a, p. 183, 187, 191), the Chinese ‘hunger’ or ‘thirst’ for raw materials and oil 
(ibid., p. 193, 184), ‘stealing’ and ‘plundering’ of raw materials (ibid., p. 188, 184), are often used. 
These words shape a certain image of China’s trade and aid policy. It portrays China as an 
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‘abnormal’ actor, which does not comply to ‘universal’ principles. Namely, the use of these 
negative and subjective words to describe its interference in Africa, the EP simultaneously 
dissociates the EU’s policy from that of China’s. It takes its own normative narrative as ‘normal’, 
and therefore, China’s policy is simultaneously portrayed as abnormal.  
Another example of a subjective rhetoric about China in Africa is the following quote by 
Paul Marie Coûteaux from the Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) Group: 
 
[China] is making a laughing stock of the whole world, because it knows that the world is market-
led and that it covets the Chinese market. Therefore, it does exactly what it wants. Its domination 
will be all the more complete since, through political cunning, the Chinese government has 
managed to outmanoeuvre Europe, Mr Michel, to get to Africa, thus gaining control of our staple 
commodities. Who can blame it? It is only profiting from our weakness, not least of all the stupid 
and dangerous disengagement of Europe, and France in particular, from a continent which will 
become increasingly important to us in the 21stcentury (European Parliament, 2008a, p. 180) 
 
Notably, the  MEP talks about ‘our staple commodities’ instead calling it the African 
commodities, for instance. Thus, although some of the MEPs accusing China of neocolonialism, 
this quote illustrates that the EU is not any better. Thus, behind the normative narrative of 
solidarity lie economic interests in the EU’s development policy. What is also remarkable about 
this quote – in particular, the first sentence -, is that the MEP places China in opposition against 
the world. He transforms the problems the EU has with China in Africa into a problem which 
concerns the whole world. Thereby, he implicitly states that the ideas of the EU are universal, 
and China goes against this. China is portrayed as the ‘bully’ in the international community, 
when the MEP says that China ‘is making a laughing stock of the whole world’. In addition, using 
the words ‘political cunning’ is also a quite subjective way of saying ‘diplomacy’.  
Remarkable is a statement in the  EP’s report China’s policy and its effects on Africa (2008a). It 
contains the following: ‘When engagement does not work, the EU should not underestimate the 
power of privately and publicly criticising China’ (p. 24). This sentence makes clear that the EP 
tries to exert soft power on China. It proposes to engage with China in their development 
policies. However, the report states that China has to comply with the values of the EU, or 
otherwise, the cooperation will not continue. If China does not want to comply with those 
values, the cooperation will not continue. And if the cooperation will not continue, it will publicly 
and privately criticize China. The EP assumes that this will led China to comply with the norms 
of the EU. In saying that ‘the EU should not underestimate the power’ of spreading these 
narratives, it seems as if the EP knows that it can use such narratives in order to put China under 
pressure. The EP knows that shaping a certain image of China would change the perception of 
 
 
24 
 
the international community towards China in Africa. Thus, the EP itself is well aware of the 
effect its rhetoric can have on other actors. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis discussed if there are other reasons behind the normative rhetoric of the  EU to 
spread negative narratives about China’s development policy in Africa.  
First, the different opinions regarding China-Africa relations of the different organs 
within the EU were discussed since 2005. It appeared that the EP had the most persistent 
negative rhetoric towards China’s involvement in Africa. This narrative was mainly centered 
around China’s lack of respect for the (European) principles of human rights, democracy and 
good governance or the rule of law.  
 However, in the section that followed, it was argued that the development policy of the 
EU is also not based on altruistic concerns. Behind the normative rhetoric of solidarity, norms 
and values, lie some hard interests in its development policy. It was claimed that the concept of 
‘normative power Europe’ can better be understood as a ‘moral economy’; the EU uses a 
normative narrative to cover up certain interest. Implementing a narrative of norms and values 
legitimizes certain external actions. However, these interests are threatened by China’s 
involvement in Africa.  
 In the section Spreading a Narrative: A Political Tool? it was argued that the EP perhaps tried 
to construct a negative representation of China in order to safeguard its own interests in Africa. 
By constructing images of the benevolent donor (the ‘self’) and realistic, self-interested images of 
the ‘other’, it tries to make the ‘self’ a more attractive donor. In addition, the EP represents its 
own values as universal, which simultaneously means that China is a ‘abnormal’ actor in its 
foreign policy. Thereby, the EU could gain normative power, which allows the EU to safeguard 
its interests in Africa.  
 In sum, the EP portrays China as a self-interested donor in its relation with Africa, while 
the EU’s policy is not any better. The EP probably does so, in order to maintain its image as a 
‘normative power’. This generates economic and political benefits.  
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